Suchergebnisse

Chapter1 -- Chapter5 -- _GoBack -- Chapter7 -- _Hlk31203049 -- _Hlk492205620 -- About the author -- Acknowledgements -- Summary -- Figures -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Revolutions and disruption -- Transaction costs and commodifying excess capacity -- Owning, renting and the commodification of excess capacity -- Cost in two-sided markets: who is buying and who is selling? -- 3 Platforms and ownership -- Selling trust raises the problem of antitrust -- Platforms don't sell stuff -- Decentralised 'retail' ownership is too expensive -- Wikipedia and tool libraries: beyond rental -- 4 Commodifying excess capacity -- 5 Middlemen: sellers of transaction cost reduction -- The middleman platform economy -- Back to transaction costs: why ownership is too expensive -- 6 Ride-sharing -- Uber: the origin -- Not a taxi company? -- Surge pricing -- 7 Problems with disruptive technology -- Sabotage: when the referee is also a player -- A different example: 'Uber but for planes' -- Fairness, exclusion and 'social credit' -- 8 Conclusion -- Change as a constant -- Saltation -- Separation -- The general answer: permissionless innovation -- Final words: the next three crises -- References -- Index -- About the IEA -- Figure 1 Housing by tenure in England: 1918-2019 -- Figure 2 Sharing economy users and US population -- Blank Page -- Chapter1 -- Chapter5 -- _GoBack -- Chapter7 -- _Hlk31203049 -- _Hlk492205620 -- About the author -- Acknowledgements -- Summary -- Figures -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Revolutions and disruption -- Transaction costs and commodifying excess capacity -- Owning, renting and the commodification of excess capacity -- Cost in two-sided markets: who is buying and who is selling? -- 3 Platforms and ownership -- Selling trust raises the problem of antitrust -- Platforms don't sell stuff -- Decentralised 'retail' ownership is too expensive.

There is a lovely apocryphal story, generally told about Dwight D. Eisenhower during his time as president of Columbia University: The school was growing, necessitating an expansion of the campus, which produced a very hot dispute between two groups of planners and architects about where the sidewalks should go.

SUMMARYPreferences and beliefs are more widely and systematically shared than might be predicted by a subjective, idiosyncratic view arising out of neoclassical economics. Two works were published twenty five years ago on just this question, contesting conceptions of belief acquisition: Denzau and North (1994) and Hinich and Munger (1994). Denzau and North argued that beliefs are simplified representations of reality that provide conventional means of interpreting the world around us; Hinich and Munger agreed. But Denzau and North argued that beliefs were essentially self‐perpetuating, and not subject to optimizing revision based on feedback, while Hinich and Munger followed the orthodox Downsian notion of a heuristic that economizes (in equilibrium) on the cost of becoming informed about politics. The big difference is that the Hume‐Denzau‐North conception follows the "Folk Theorem," making no claim about the optimality of the belief systems that a society comes to share.

Abstract:This essay develops a notion of "functional corruption," adapted from sociology, to note that the harm of corruption appears to be contingent. In a system of dysfunctional institutions, corruption can improve the efficiency and speed of allocative mechanisms of the bureaucracy, possibly quite substantially. The problem is that this "short run" benefit locks in the long run harm of corruption by making institutions much more difficult to reform. In particular, a nation with bad institutions but without bureaucracy may be much more open to reform than a nation with similarly bad institutions but with "efficiently corrupt" bureaucrats. The idea of a "long run" is developed using the North, Wallis, and Weingast conception of open access orders. Corrupt systems are likely to be locked into closed access orders indefinitely, even though everyone knows there are better institutions available.

AbstractThe arguments for redistribution of wealth, and for prohibiting certain transactions such as price-gouging, both are based in mistaken conceptions of exchange. This paper proposes a neologism, "euvoluntary" exchange, meaning both that the exchange is truly voluntary and that it benefits both parties to the transaction. The argument has two parts: First, all euvoluntary exchanges should be permitted, and there is no justification for redistribution of wealth if disparities result only from euvoluntary exchanges. Second, even exchanges that are not euvoluntary should generally be permitted, because access to market exchange may be the only means by which people in desperate circumstances can improve their position.